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SLOVITER, Chief Judge. 
 
 
 This case is before us on the appeal of defendant John 
R. Copple from that portion of the district court's judgment of 
sentence ordering restitution in the amount of $4,257,940.45.  In 
an earlier appeal in the same case, we vacated the judgment of 
sentence and remanded for resentencing.  We directed the district 
court, inter alia, to make findings about Copple's ability to pay 
restitution.  Following a hearing, the court reimposed the same 
amount of restitution.  We conclude that Copple's argument that 
the restitution order is unreasonable and clearly excessive in 
light of the record developed at the resentencing hearing is 
well-taken.   
I. 
 The facts are fully set forth in our prior opinion, 
United States v. Copple, 24 F.3d 535 (3d Cir.) (Copple I), cert. 
denied, 115 S. Ct. 488 (1994), and we therefore repeat only so 
far as is necessary in the context of this appeal.  Copple, who 
was convicted on multiple counts of mail fraud and income tax 
evasion, had defrauded funeral directors of funds which he had 
promised to channel into low-risk/high-return investments. Copple 
and his investment firm obtained $12 million from the  
pre-paid funeral plans of a large number of funeral directors, 
but instead of investing the money as promised Copple used it to 
increase his personal assets and live extravagantly.  Copple's 
firm filed for bankruptcy.   
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 The bankruptcy trustee, who discovered Copple's 
misappropriation, was able to recoup only a limited amount of 
these assets, primarily several accounts and deposits totalling 
$389,356.51 and coins from Copple's rare coin collection that 
were later auctioned off for $209,045.  The loss to the victims 
of Copple's swindle was $4,257,940.45.  See Copple I, 24 F.3d at 
538-40.  
 A jury convicted Copple on 34 counts of mail fraud and 
3 counts of income tax evasion.  Copple was sentenced to 71 
months imprisonment, a $100,000 fine, a special assessment of 
$1850 and three years supervised release.  The district court 
accepted the findings in the presentence report concerning money 
due victims, and ordered Copple to pay restitution of 
$4,257,940.45.  
 Copple appealed, challenging both his conviction and 
sentence.  This court affirmed the conviction, but vacated the 
sentence because the district court impermissibly based an upward 
departure on the large number of victims and the amount of 
monetary loss involved.     
 More relevant for our purposes here is our discussion 
of the restitution portion of the district court's judgment.  We 
emphasized our cases instructing that restitution orders be 
grounded on specific factual findings regarding the defendant's 
economic circumstances and other relevant financial information. 
We noted that the district court had failed to make any such 
findings to support its restitution order of $4,257,940.45, and 
"therefore remand[ed] for the district court to make the factual 
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findings necessary to support such order of restitution as it may 
make."  Id. at 549-50. 
 On remand, the district court conducted a resentencing 
hearing.  Mary Copple, Copple's wife and the caretaker for their 
two minor children - Jennifer, 18 years old and John, 16 years 
old, testified that she could not work or even complete basic 
daily tasks because of chronic mental illness, that she required 
and had been receiving psychiatric treatment for three years, and 
that her husband and her daughter also suffered from mental 
illness and were under physicians' care.  App. at 53-66.  She 
stated that her only steady income was $403 in monthly welfare 
payments and $292 in monthly food stamps, and that the occasional 
commission checks she had received from her husband's insurance 
policy renewals totalled $300.  She testified that her home was 
subject to foreclosure after her failure to pay mortgage payments 
for 15 months, that any remaining equity was subject to levy by 
the bankruptcy trustee, that the home's electricity and gas 
utilities had been discontinued for her inability to pay bills, 
and that her only other assets were $400 in a bank account, some 
furniture, and a 1987 Cadillac.  Id. at 58-70. 
 Jennifer Copple, Copple's eighteen-year old daughter, 
testified that she suffered from manic depression, was on 
medication and had been undergoing regular therapy, and as a 
result could attend school only part-time.  Id. at 73-75.  The 
government presented no evidence at the hearing.   The court 
resentenced Copple to a shorter term of 63 months imprisonment, 
vacated the $100,000 fine it had imposed earlier, and reimposed 
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the $1,850 special assessment and three-year period of supervised 
release.   
 In addition, the court again ordered that Copple pay 
restitution of $4,257,940.45.  After establishing that "[t]he 
identification of the various victims and the amounts of 
individual losses are consistent with the testimony of the 
various funeral directors at trial and were not challenged by the 
Defendant," App. at 103, the district court renewed its order of 
full restitution on the following basis: 
With respect to the Defendant's ability to 
pay, obviously, according to the testimony of 
his wife, the family is in dire financial 
straits at this time.  But Mr. Copple is a 
college graduate.  He certainly has been 
successful, albeit in an unlawful way in many 
instances, but he's certainly been a 
successful businessman as far as gaining the 
ends which he hoped to gain in the business 
world.  So I think certainly the potential is 
there for him to succeed with respect to his 
finances in the future. 
 
App. at 104. 
   
 Copple challenges only the restitution order on this 
appeal.  The district court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 
§3231, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
We conduct plenary review to determine whether a restitution 
order is permitted under law, but review the specific order only 
for abuse of discretion.  United States v. Graham, No. 94-1370, 
1995 WL 744974, at *2 (3d Cir. Dec. 18, 1995). 
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II. 
 The requirements according to which a district court 
may permissibly fashion and validly impose a restitution order 
are contained in the two provisions of the Victim and Witness 
Protection Act of 1982 (VWPA), since recodified at 18 U.S.C. 
§§3663 and 3664 and incorporated into United States Sentencing 
Guideline § 5E1.1 and its accompanying commentary.  18 U.S.C. 
§3663 authorizes a sentencing court to order that a defendant 
make restitution to any victims of the offense of conviction.  18 
U.S.C. § 3663(a)(1) (1994).  Before the court does so, it must 
consider the following specific factors:  "the amount of the loss 
sustained by any victim as a result of the offense, the financial 
resources of the defendant, the financial needs and earning 
ability of the defendant and the defendant's dependents, and such 
other factors as the court deems appropriate."  18 U.S.C. 
§3664(a) (1994).   
 In order to facilitate meaningful appellate review, 
this court has exercised its supervisory power to require the 
district courts "to make specific findings as to the factual 
issues that are relevant to the application of the restitution 
provisions of the VWPA."  United States v. Palma, 760 F.2d 475, 
480 (3d Cir. 1985).  In Copple I, we referred to our earlier 
opinion in United States v. Logar, 975 F.2d 958, 961 (3d Cir. 
1992), where we identified the following factual matters to be 
considered by the sentencing court before ordering restitution: 
1) the amount of loss, 2) the defendant's ability to 
pay and the financial need of the defendant and the 
defendant's dependents, and 3) the relationship between 
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the restitution imposed and the loss caused by the 
defendant's conduct. 
 
 
See Copple I, 24 F.3d at 549.  We also stated that the court  
 
must point to the evidence . . . supporting the 
calculation of loss to the victims. 
 
Id. at 549-50.  Copple argues that the district court failed to 
follow those explicit directions on remand.  
 Before it reinstated its restitution order, the 
district court noted that the government's "identification of the 
various victims and the amounts of individual losses" were 
undisputed and had been corroborated by testimony at trial.  App. 
at 103.  Thus, the court satisfied our instruction to make an 
explicit finding regarding the amount of the victims' loss, and 
Copple does not argue otherwise. 
 Instead, this appeal centers on the court's conclusion 
that Copple would be able to pay the amount of restitution it 
set.  The court based that conclusion on the "findings" that 
"Copple is a college graduate" and that "[h]e certainly has been 
successful, albeit in an unlawful way in many instances, . . . in 
the business world."  App. at 104.  It made no findings 
concerning Copple's financial resources.  Nor did it make 
findings about Copple's financial needs, and observed only that 
"the family is in dire financial straits at this time," an 
assertion hardly supportive of the exceptionally large 
restitution amount it ultimately ordered.   
   The government makes essentially two arguments in its 
effort to sustain the district court's restitution order.  First 
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it argues that the order can be upheld on the bases given by the 
district court, and that the district court properly considered 
Copple's college education, skills and intelligence in 
determining his future ability to pay.  We agree that if there is 
a reasonable basis for a projection of the defendant's future 
earning ability, a restitution order can be grounded on these 
factors.  In this case, however, notwithstanding our prior remand 
to give the district court the opportunity to furnish the 
specific findings that we have held must accompany the 
restitution order, no such findings were made.  After noting 
Copple's college degree and business acumen, the district court 
imposed its restitution order based merely on the following 
conclusion:  "So I think certainly the potential is there for 
[Copple] to succeed with respect to his finances in the future." 
App. at 104.  
  Despite the government's valiant efforts to defend 
this conclusion, it is most telling that it concedes that 
"[a]dmittedly, [the district judge] did not explain how he 
arrived at the conclusion that Copple, by virtue of a college 
education and business acumen, could earn, by legitimate means, 
enough to support his family, to pay his back taxes and current 
taxes and to clear $4,257,940.45 for restitution."  Brief of 
Appellee at 19.  The government suggests that based on the 
evidence presented at sentencing, "one might well conjecture that 
Copple could be expected to clear, at most, $250,000 to be used 
toward restitution ($50,000 per year over a five year period)." 
Brief of Appellee at 20 (emphasis added).  There is nothing in 
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the record to support the government's suggestion that a man with 
an ill wife and two children, who apparently also have emotional 
problems, could clear $50,000 a year.  Persons in far more 
favorable circumstances would have difficulty doing so. Moreover, 
as the government recognizes, the restitution order in this case 
was not $250,000 but more than sixteen times that amount.  We 
cannot sustain any restitution order, much less one in excess of 
$4 million, on conjecture. 
 The second argument the government makes to support the 
restitution order is based on its contention that Copple has not 
yet accounted for all the assets he acquired with the 
misappropriated funds, which the government claims include 
$427,000 from Copple's pre-bankruptcy sale of some of his rare 
coins and $196,334 in furniture.  It argues that the district 
court's liberal restitution order can be viewed as an "implicit" 
attempt to capture unidentified holdings that Copple has failed 
to produce voluntarily. 
 It is not improbable that the district court's 
restitution order may have been motivated by a reasonable 
apprehension that Copple has secreted certain assets, even though 
the court did not say so.  It does not follow, however, that 
factual findings supporting such an apprehension must be as 
covert as the hidden assets themselves.   
 The government contends that the district court could 
reasonably have accorded little credibility to Copple's showings 
regarding his lack of ability to pay in light of Copple's 
suspected retention of certain assets and his generally 
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uncooperative attitude in accounting for and turning over other 
assets to the bankruptcy trustee.  However, the district court 
made no explicit finding of lack of credibility.  Even if the 
district court's order were premised on its disbelief of Copple's 
assertions, we cannot affirm a restitution order where the amount 
fixed is based merely on the court's lack of confidence in the 
defendant.  
 We do not suggest that a defendant who has become 
expert at secreting the proceeds of the crime can avoid the 
obligation to disgorge them.  The proceeds from a defendant's 
illegal conduct that the defendant still retains or can recoup 
are certainly encompassed within the "financial resources of the 
defendant," 18 U.S.C. § 3664(a), that the district court should 
consider in fashioning a restitution order.  Of course, the 
continued existence of such proceeds is a factual issue that 
should be accompanied by "specific findings." 
 Although we have not seen it applied elsewhere, we 
believe there is a method by which the court can fashion a 
restitution order that accounts for the court's reasonable belief 
that there are secreted assets and that satisfies the court's 
obligation to make the necessary supporting findings.  Under 18 
U.S.C. § 3664(d), the sentencing court has broad discretion to 
assign to either party "[t]he burden of demonstrating such other  
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matters as the court deems appropriate" in the course of its 
fact-finding.  It would be sufficient for a district court that 
believes, based on the record, that such proceeds are still 
available to determine the amount properly attributable to the 
defendant with reasonable precision.  
 For example, in this case the court may adopt as a 
starting figure the total amount of value (cash, asset values, 
etc.) that (1) Copple was found originally to have appropriated 
and (2) for which he has not yet accounted.  The court should 
then permit Copple to prove that he is, in fact, not in 
possession of any part of that total amount by specific evidence 
showing the amount of disbursements and their destination. Unless 
Copple can disprove possession of any remaining amount in this 
manner, the court may consider the resulting figure as 
constituting "financial resources of the defendant."  The court 
may then make its determination of Copple's capacity to pay the 
ordered amount within five years, taking into account the 
resources arrived at by the above method along with other 
relevant factors, such as the financial needs and earning ability 
of Copple and his dependents.  See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3664(a) &  
§ 3663(f). 
 We believe this approach is preferable to the 
speculative exercise that the government would have us perform. 
For one thing, it enhances the basis for appellate review.  More 
important, it places the responsibility for accounting for funds 
misappropriated squarely on the individual who misappropriated 
them.  Assigning to Copple the burden of proving disgorgement of 
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the total amount appropriated is consistent with (1) the 
statutory mandate, see 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d) ("The burden of 
demonstrating the financial resources of the defendant . . . 
shall be on the defendant."), (2) the legislative history of the 
VWPA, see S. Rep. No. 532, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 31, reprinted in 
1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2515, 2537 (quoted in U.S.S.G. § 5E1.1, 
comment. (backg'd.)) ("In those unusual cases where the precise 
amount owed is difficult to determine, the section authorizes the 
court to reach an expeditious, reasonable determination of 
appropriate restitution by resolving uncertainties with a view 
toward achieving fairness to the victim."), and (3) our policy-
based conviction that defendants ought not be permitted to 
profit, quite literally, from uncertainty for which their illegal 
conduct is ultimately responsible. 
 Because we cannot sustain the restitution order on the 
basis of the findings that the district court made, we must once 
again, albeit reluctantly, remand this case.  In doing so, we 
recapitulate some relevant principles:  First, "[a]ny dispute as 
to the proper amount or type of restitution shall be resolved by 
the court by the preponderance of the evidence."  18 U.S.C. 
§3664(d).  Second, although indigency at the time of sentencing 
is not a bar to ordering restitution, see United States v. 
Hallman, 23 F.3d 821, 827 (3d Cir.) (citing Logar, 975 F.2d at 
962), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 216 (1994), the sentencing court 
should ground the amount of restitution ordered on realistic 
prospects that the defendant will be able to pay it, and not on 
fantastic or overly speculative possibilities.  See Hallman, 23 
13 
F.3d at 827 (restitution order "may not be based on some future 
fortuitous event that may befall the appellant, but must be based 
on realistic expectations"); United States v. Seale, 20 F.3d 
1279, 1286 (3d Cir. 1994) (in determining future earning 
capacity, "some degree of certainty is required"); Logar, 975 
F.2d 958, 964 (limiting the district court to consideration of 
"realistic" possible additional sources of income); United States 
v. Mahoney, 859 F.2d 47, 52 (7th Cir. 1988) (describing 
impossible restitution orders as "shams" and as "defeating any 
hope of restitution and impeding the rehabilitation process").  
Third, the restitution obligation is intended for repayment 
within five years.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3663(f); United States v. 
Sleight, 808 F.2d 1012, 1021 (3d Cir. 1987). 
 The relevant determination in favor of an order of 
restitution, therefore, is not a court's vague appreciation of a 
defendant's "potential to succeed" financially at some point in 
the undefined future, but, rather, its finding by a preponderance 
of the evidence that there exists a realistic prospect that 
defendant will be able to pay the required amount within five 
years. 
 Although we stop short of ruling on the substantive 
appropriateness of the particular restitution amount ordered by 
the district court, we cannot avoid noting that the 
extraordinarily ambitious amount ordered, in excess of four 
million dollars, appears, at the very least, somewhat 
counterintuitive in light of the court's contemporaneous decision 
to vacate the $100,000 fine it originally imposed "in view of 
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[Copple's] financial situation."  App. at 104.  The absence of 
explicit findings on the crucial factual issues prevents us from 
evaluating confidently the incongruity thereby presented.  See 
Graham, 1995 WL 744974, at *7 n.2 (while "anomalous that the 
district court concluded that [defendant] would be able to pay 
approximately $46,000.00 in restitution if he is unable to pay 
any fine, . . . the lack of record findings makes these claims 
difficult to review").   
 Of course, the district court may well have considered 
the distinct standards governing an order of restitution and the 
imposition of a fine.  Compare U.S.S.G. § 5E1.1, comment. 
(backg'd.) (instructing only that court ordering restitution 
"consider" factors indicative of defendant's ability to pay) with 
U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2(a) (instructing court not to impose fine where 
"the defendant establishes that he is unable to pay and is not 
likely to become able to pay").  It may also have considered the 
difference in the time-frames for payment.  Compare U.S.S.G. 
§5E1.1, comment. (backg'd.) (imposing a maximum five-year time 
limit on payment of restitution) with U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2(g) (time 
before fine paid "generally should not exceed twelve months"). 
See generally United States v. Ahmad, 2 F.3d 245, 247-49 (7th 
Cir. 1993) (attempting reconciliation of district court's 
decisions to order restitution and withhold imposition of fine 
with possible justifications). 
 Even if the government is correct that Copple has 
retained $623,334 in assets, under the court's order Copple must 
come up with over $3.6 million in five years to satisfy the 
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restitution order, plus an additional $665,859 to pay off back 
taxes.  Copple is currently incarcerated, has a wife and two 
children to support after he completes his term, and faces his 
employment prospects with fraud and tax evasion convictions in 
tow.  The value of a college degree notwithstanding, we cannot 
say--in the absence of the factual findings discussed--that on 
substantive review we could conclude the court's order to be 
factually supportable. 
    III. 
 In light of the foregoing, we will vacate the district 
court's restitution order and remand for the required factual 
findings supporting such order of restitution as it may make.  
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ALITO, Circuit Judge, concurring: 
 
 I join the opinion of the court.  While restitution for 
victims is very important, no good is done by restitution orders 
that vastly exceed a defendant's ability to pay and that 
therefore will never be satisfied. 
 The defendant in this case caused great suffering for 
the victims of his crimes, while he and his family used the 
stolen funds to live lavishly.  As we observed in our earlier 
opinion, the defendant's personal expenditures during a three-
year period totalled $2.5 million, including more than $500,000 
for jewelry and nearly that much for gifts to his family.  24 
F.3d at 539.    
 Defendants convicted of fraud offenses are sometimes 
masters at hiding assets.  Therefore, if the government bore the 
burden of proving that such defendants still possess illegally 
obtained assets, the government would be unable to locate hidden 
assets, those assets would not be taken into account in framing 
the restitution orders, and the defendants would continue to 
profit at the expense of the innocent victims.  This would be 
unconscionable. 
 The solution is to place the burden of proof on the 
defendant to show what has happened to all of the illegally 
obtained assets.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d).  All the assets for 
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which the defendant cannot account may be included in the amount 
of restitution ordered.  To the extent that records are 
unavailable, the risk of inaccuracy should be borne by the 
defendant rather than the victims. 
